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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

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memo
Chrono

16 November 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

THROUGH: Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Peace Movement

At your press conference last week you had another question on Communist support to the peace movement. You are likely to be pressed on this again. I attach a new paper on "Peace Groups and Leaders in INF Basing Countries" which may be useful in supporting your response, along with solid intelligence reports that:

1. In April 1982 the Soviet [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] 25X1
[redacted] provided cash and directions 25X1
for this individual to support the staging of the anti-nuclear
demonstrations held in New York in June 1982.
2. In March 1982 the KGB tasked its agents to collect information
about the structure, slogans and political platforms, identities of
influential figures, plans for demonstrations and conferences, and
proposals for the possible use of the anti-war movement in "active
measures" operations.
3. Also, in March 1982 KGB residencies received direction to get
participants at the June demonstration in New York to adopt slogans
placing sole responsibility for the arms race on the US and to get
anti-war contacts to well-known public figures in the US known to be
demanding curbs on the arms race.

I am having the attached paper on "Peace Groups and Leaders in INF Basing Countries" sanitized in the hope that it can be used in information programs which SACEUR plans to bring to the European public.


William G. Casey

Attachment:
CR 82-14875/EUR 82-10114

Distribution (Over)

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Intelligence

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Peace Groups and Leaders in INF Basing Countries

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A Research Paper

This paper was prepared by [redacted] Office of
Central Reference, and [redacted] Office of
European Analysis. Contributions were made by

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[redacted]
of Central Reference. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be addressed to the Chief,
Europe Division, OCR, or [redacted] Chief,
European Issues Division, EURA, on [redacted]

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This paper was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations, the National Intelligence Council
Analytic Group, and the National Intelligence
Council [redacted]

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**Peace Groups and Leaders
in INF Basing Countries**

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Overview

*Information available
as of 25 October 1982
was used in this report.*

This research paper discusses the most prominent peace organizations and leaders in the five West European countries designated by NATO as hosts for Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) basing: West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and Italy. It is in these countries that the West European "peace movement" poses the greatest immediate threat to US interests because of the pressures it creates against INF. It is also in these countries that the largest antinuclear demonstrations have taken place.

The groups discussed here do not constitute the entire peace movement in these countries; indeed, their memberships probably provide less than half the demonstrators in the streets. Nevertheless, this study of the most prominent groups covers a substantial cross section of peace movement ideas and activity and should provide a valuable resource for information on major organizations and leaders.

Peace activity is only one of the many factors that West European political leaders must take into account when deciding defense policy. But it is a dramatic phenomenon that, given the right political context, could be decisive on certain security issues and affect the shape of relations with the United States for years to come.

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Peace Groups and Leaders in INF Basing Countries

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Peace Groups in Perspective

Organized peace groups have been a familiar feature of the West European political scene for decades. Prominent during the ban-the-bomb campaigns of the late 1950s and early 1960s, they were drained by a long period of public indifference from the early 1960s until the late 1970s. After the start of the anti-neutron-bomb campaign of 1977-78, however, peace activity accelerated dramatically. The sizes of the crowds and the amount of media attention during the past two years have set new records for protest activity in postwar Western Europe. We believe that the recent hiatus in arms control progress, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and instability in Poland have combined with increased public awareness of Europe-oriented weapons systems to heighten public concern about nuclear risks and led large numbers of people to join in opposing new nuclear weapons.

The "Peace" Movement and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)

In our view, the greatest immediate threat that the movement poses to US interests lies in the pressures it creates against INF. It is no coincidence that the countries with the strongest peace movements—or at least those that have had the largest antinuclear demonstrations—are those on whose soil INF deployment is supposed to take place: West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and Italy. INF has been a catalyst for peace sentiment because the public has received the message in the press and the electronic media that it represents a new step in the arms race. Moreover, public discussion of INF has often focused on Western Europe's supposed impotence in the face of increasing nuclear risks. INF is to be the first Europe-based missile system in 20 years capable of reaching the Soviet Union, and much press commentary contends that because it is a US-controlled system host governments will have no say about whether it should be employed.

Composition of the Movement

The groups and individuals involved in agitation against government security policies in Western Europe defy attempts to characterize them precisely. Among them are party organizations of various political persuasions, church groups, student groups, environmentalists, and many other concerned individuals. While leftists predominate in peace activity and provide most of the activists, many self-described moderates and even conservatives also take part. The active role played by Catholics in Belgium and the Netherlands, for example, is one of the more striking facets of recent peace activity because it contrasts with their earlier disinclination to take controversial positions on security questions. Rivalry and distrust exist even among the leftist participants. Membership figures are often unreliable, and groups change their names, split, or merge.

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The degree of centralization in peace activity varies considerably. In the United Kingdom, for example, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament is by far the predominant organization in terms of membership and probably provides a majority of demonstrators in the streets. At the other extreme is West Germany, where the movement is a kaleidoscope of more than 1,000 groups, and the ones discussed here represent only a minority of those who demonstrate.

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What these groups and individuals have in common—and what defines them collectively as a peace movement—is the conviction that their own governments and the United States are doing too little to reduce the dangers of a nuclear war, and a demand that the West reduce these dangers by making at least initial concessions to the East. While all elements of the movement agree that the momentum of the arms race should be reversed, the complex and emotional subject of nuclear weapons leads them to diverse policy

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conclusions. Peace groups often cannot agree on how radical their demands should be or on an alternative security policy [redacted]

One pattern common to all five countries is the division of opinion within the movement on the question of military balance. Almost all elements of the movement demand at least "initial concessions" by the United States in arms policy, but the more radical deny the need for a military balance or even a military establishment at all, calling instead for total disarmament and political neutrality. Though often papered over, this division can also be seen at times in the attitude toward the current arms control process: many in the movement endorse arms control, but the more radical contend that it only perpetuates the arms race. Such disagreements have become more apparent recently, and may well grow in importance if arms control negotiations show signs of progress [redacted]

This paper discusses the peace groups that are the largest, or that have played an important role in demonstrations. Not all of these groups, however, are equally important. Some of them, moreover, are national "umbrella" organizations that have no direct membership but have secured the affiliation of a variety of individual peace organizations. We have described the philosophy of the umbrella groups primarily on the basis of statements by their leaders, but not all of their affiliates would subscribe to these statements. Just below the surface, the pot of diverse ideologies continues to boil [redacted]

We believe that formal organizations are not necessarily the most important potential influence on national security policy. In our judgment, political leaders pay less attention to the hard-core agitators—a type they have seen for decades—than to supporters of the movement among apparently moderate or previously apolitical sectors of the public. In most countries there are many people who have not joined a specific peace group or taken to the streets, but whose opposition to nuclear weapons is confirmed in public opinion surveys. These people can be considered part of the peace movement broadly construed, and West European political leaders, who increasingly use political polling, are sensitive to the possible effects of peace sentiment at the ballot box [redacted]

Communist and Soviet Influence

During the lean years for peace activism, Communist parties were the main groups actively pushing the cause, and in some countries practically the only ones. Thus, when the campaign against the neutron bomb captured the public imagination in 1977-78, the Communists were in a position to provide leadership and agitational expertise to the masses of new militants who were not particular about their marching partners. Peace organizations during that period tended in effect to be Communist fronts or nearly so. Even after the focus changed to anti-INF agitation in 1979, the Communists retained a disproportionate (though diminishing) influence over the planning and execution of demonstrations. [redacted]

The actions of Soviet officials indicate their belief that pressure against NATO arms programs—particularly INF—serves their country's interest. Soviet leaders typically tailor their statements on security issues to appeal to the West European public. Several sophisticated and articulate officials of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) spend much of their time trying to popularize the Soviet view on armaments questions. This group includes Vadim Zagladin, first deputy chief of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee; Leonid M. Zamyatin, chief of the International Information Department of the CPSU Central Committee, Valentin Falin, Zamyatin's first chief deputy; and Georgiy Arbatov, director of the Institute of the USA and Canada. In addition to these spokesmen, a network of minor Soviet officials performs liaison duties to local Communist parties and sometimes is represented at meetings of peace groups. While many peace activists are skeptical about Soviet good will on arms issues, they are often impressed by the willingness of Soviets to talk to them and to be interviewed by the West European press, and by what they perceive to be the flexibility of Soviet positions. [redacted]

Reliable sources have described how Soviet representatives have often given top priority to the peace campaign when meeting with West European Communists. [redacted]

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[redacted] East German officials frequently counsel local West European Communist parties in the tactics they wish to see pursued. [redacted]

It appears, however, that the Soviet commitment does not extend to major financial contributions. The Soviets and East Germans often provide funding through local Communist parties and fronts for such items as transportation and printing. We believe, however, that non-Communist organizations provide the bulk of the funding for the larger rallies, in which they generally predominate, and that many individual demonstrators take care of their own expenses. [redacted]

[redacted] noted recently that the anti-neutron-bomb campaign of 1977-78, which was generally a Communist-dominated operation, was financed largely through fund-raising events and contributions from individual participants rather than from Moscow. [redacted]

[redacted] In our judgment, therefore, levels of peace activity would not be affected greatly if the movement had to do without financial contributions from Moscow. [redacted]

The Soviets and some of the West European Communist parties are conducting an elaborate covert campaign intended to attract broad participation in peace activities. The Soviets use forgeries, for example, to try to discredit the United States and NATO in Western Europe. At times, however, these efforts have been clumsy and have been exposed by Western governments to good effect. For example, an article in a Norwegian newspaper in November 1981 cited a document that "proved" US intentions to use nuclear weapons against Norway under certain circumstances. The document was exposed as the latest fraudulent rewrite of a NATO document stolen 20 years before which contained no such references to Norway. Another example of Soviet active measures came to light last winter in Denmark, where the Soviets employed a Danish journalist as a conduit for channeling funds to a peace group that they favored.

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This episode was publicized by the Danish Government and resulted in heavy public criticism of the Soviets, resignations by many non-Communists from the peace group, and the expulsion of a Soviet diplomat. [redacted] 25X1

At Soviet insistence, most of the local Communist parties have thrown themselves into alliances of convenience with socialists, social democrats, ecologists, religious groups, and a wide variety of leftist fringe groups that historically have been their bitter rivals. The Communists do their best to dominate such groupings. Especially during the early burgeoning of peace activity, many in the movement did not fully understand Communist techniques of political manipulation, or realize which of their colleagues in the movement were Communists working to promote Moscow's interests. [redacted] 25X1 noted recently that most peace activists in their country claim to be aware of such Communist tactics, but the penetration of essentially non-Communist peace organizations by unacknowledged Communists who have the time and resources to devote to such activity is a continuing problem. [redacted] 25X1

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Such *sub rosa* influence, however, is insufficient to explain why the movement has attracted such a broad constituency during the past two years after approximately two decades of failure by Communist-sponsored groups using similar tactics. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] have noted that the strength of non-Communist participation in the movement indicates that it would be influential and opposed to many NATO policies even without Communist involvement. Public opinion surveys in West Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium support this contention; they indicate that Communist participation is at most 15 percent. [redacted] 25X1

Furthermore, the balance of forces within the peace movement is becoming more unfavorable to the Communists. In the Northern European countries where the movement is strongest, Communist leverage has diminished during the past year as the base of the movement has expanded. The non-Communist parts of the movement now have funds to hire their own

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militants to work on a permanent or semipermanent basis, and these elements have gained experience and confidence in promoting protest activity. Now the Soviets sometimes find themselves in the uncomfortable position of having to deal primarily with their docile front organizations, or encouraging broader peace groups that have more credibility with the public, but also criticize Soviet policies. [REDACTED]

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The balance of forces in the Italian peace movement is quite different from that in Northern Europe. The Communist Party (PCI) is more than ever the primary actor in the peace movement. PCI leaders, however, appear to be motivated more by domestic politics than by Moscow's efforts to encourage peace activity. We believe that the PCI wants to benefit with the voters by being the main "force for peace" in Italy, and at the same time to avoid losing votes on the peace issue to the small parties of the far left. [REDACTED]

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In the Netherlands, the powerful Interchurch Peace Council (IKV) has begun to speak out critically on the same issues. In May an IKV official went to Moscow intending to bring up Soviet arms policy and human rights in Eastern Europe at the "Peace Congress of World Religions." When he was denied the right to speak, he walked out and made his points to the Western press. The IKV has also been criticized by some elements in the peace movement for its insistence on supporting groups such as Solidarity in Poland, and the Czech dissident group Charter '77. [REDACTED]

We believe that some of this increased desire to be "evenhanded" arises from a genuine resentment about Soviet policies and about the Communists who try to force those policies on the movement. At the same time, some movement leaders probably realize that good public relations increasingly demand a critical stance toward some Soviet policies. [REDACTED]

In either case, the resulting fragmentation and criticism has caused worry among local Communist party officials and in Moscow [REDACTED]

The Italian Communists in the past have often been a thorn in the side of the Soviets. The party criticized the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and more recently criticized the Soviet line on Afghanistan and Poland. In the wake of martial law in Poland, the PCI went so far as to state that the Soviet model for Communism was invalid.¹ In our judgment, such PCI criticism at times has detracted from Moscow's prestige and impaired Soviet ability to conduct effective propaganda campaigns in Western Europe. Although the PCI's present activism against INF deployment serves Moscow's interests, we believe that the party would quickly abandon this position should the PCI leadership determine that its role in the peace movement is costing the party political support [REDACTED]

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Growing international contact among the various West European peace groups also is working against

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¹ For a fuller discussion, see DDI Intelligence Memorandum, EUR 82-1004 [REDACTED] April 1982, *The PCI and the Italian Political Game: The Impact of Poland* [REDACTED]

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Soviet attempts to control the movement. Such contact consists primarily of exchanges of opinion, mutual encouragement, and publicity seeking, rather than binding decisions. Newly created international umbrella groups like the International Communication and Coordination Center and the Campaign for European Nuclear Disarmament have reduced the role of the Communists and undermined the influence of the Moscow-dominated World Peace Council (WPC). Although the WPC leadership, like the West European Communist parties, often congratulates itself on "successes" in promoting peace activity, the biggest demonstrations are generally those that owe the least to WPC efforts. For example, it was the Dutch IKV rather than a WPC affiliate that took the lead in organizing the demonstration in Amsterdam last November, which was probably the largest that the new West European peace movement has generated. []

Communists still retain greater influence in the peace movement than their relatively small numbers would imply. Nevertheless, we believe that with the exception of Italy the main impetus behind peace activity today—in terms of ideas and control as well as participation and funding—comes from non-Communist elements within these countries rather than from their Communist parties or the Soviet Union. This can be attributed in part to the heightened awareness among movement leaders of Communist and Soviet attempts to steamroll them, but it is due also to the wider composition of the movement. We believe that even in the absence of further Soviet assistance the peace movement would have sufficient momentum to maintain substantial pressure on key NATO governments. []

The broadening of the composition and concerns of the movement to encompass more non-Communist elements and greater agitation against Soviet policies presents some problems for the Soviets. They are concerned that peace groups increasingly criticize their nuclear weapons policy and their policies in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, in our judgment, even the more "nonaligned" segments of the movement pose far greater dangers to Western than to Soviet interests. Virtually everyone in the movement still focuses primarily against NATO's INF program. If pressures produced by the movement helped to kill that program, it would be a boon for the Soviets outweighing any damage caused by increased anti-Soviet activity. [] 25X1

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